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ABSTRACT 
 
A Study on Political Economy of Peripheral and Advanced Capitalism: 
 A Simultaneous Transformation with Different Results in the post-1980 United 
States, United Kingdom and Turkey 
 
Kalkan, Kerem Ozan 
M.A,   Department of Political Science 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre 
 
June 2005 
 
 
 This thesis focuses on the post-1980 neo-liberal transformation experienced 
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. These are the countries which 
started to implement neo-liberal policies simultaneously under Ronald Reagan, 
Margaret Thatcher and Turgut Özal administrations. I developed a political economy 
outlook on these countries in such a fashion that compares welfare state 
implementations to neo-liberal policies. After having analyzed four main 
macroeconomic indicators which are real GDP growth, inflation rates, real interest 
rates and real wage rates in three countries, we see that the outcomes of the 
transformation were sharply different in the advanced capitalist countries, namely the 
United States and the United Kingdom, from those of in peripheral countries like 
Turkey.  
 
Keywords: Political economy, the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, neo-
liberalism.                                                    
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ÖZET 
 
Çevre ve Gelişmiş Kapitalizmin Ekonomi Politiği Üzerine Bir Çalışma: Amerika 
Birleşik Devletleri’ndeki, Birleşik Krallık’taki ve Türkiye’deki 1980 Sonrası 
Eşzamanlı Dönüşümün Farklı Sonuçları  
 
Kalkan, Kerem Ozan 
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre 
 
Haziran 2005 
 
 Bu  çalışma,  Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde, Birleşik Krallık’ta ve 
Türkiye’de 1980 sonrası yaşanan neo-liberal dönüşüm üzerine odaklanmıştır. Bu 
ülkeler, Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher ve Turgut Özal yönetimleri altında neo-
liberal politikaların uygulamasına eşzamanlı olarak başlamıştır. Refah devleti 
uygulamalarını neo-liberal politikalarıyla mukayese eden bir ekonomi politik görüş 
geliştirdim. Reel GSYİH, enflasyon oranları, reel faiz hadleri ve reel ücretler gibi 
dört ana makroiktisadi göstergelerin analiz edilmesinden sonra, bu neo-liberal 
politikaların gelişmiş kapitalist ülkelerde, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Birleşik 
Krallık gibi, çevre ülkelere nazaran, Türkiye gibi, daha farklı sonuçlar ortaya 
koyduğunu görüyoruz. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ekonomi Politik, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Birleşik Krallık, 
Türkiye, neo-liberalizm 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the transformation experienced in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Turkey emerged from their simultaneous motion 
towards neo-liberal framework in the 1980s. In other words, it seemed, for these 
countries, as if someone waved a flag and then a race for a policy-shift started under 
Reagan, Thatcher and Özal administrations. A radical change in priorities, 
preferences and paradigms was witnessed under these leaders who were strict 
believers and followers of liberal democracy. Reagan, Thatcher and Özal were 
supported by major segments of their societies that suffered from the political and 
economic turmoil created by welfare state tradition. While inflation, unemployment 
and deficits were creating hostility towards Keynesian legacy in the 1970s, they 
prepared a legitimate and suitable ground for a neo-liberal transformation which 
promised an instant solution to all problems.  
 Since the transformation was built and even, justified on the demise of 
welfare state, I seek to address welfare state understanding together with Keynesian 
school of economic thought. This is why in the second chapter, I make a brief 
analysis of what pre-welfare state and welfare state were. The chapter goes on with a 
theoretical approach to Conservative or neo-liberal schools and ends with the 
historical evidences from the United States and the United Kingdom. These two 
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countries are put under scrutiny in order to observe the transformation period 
witnessed in the 1980s. 
 Third chapter concerns Turkey’s political economy during the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. This part has details from both economics and politics so as to see the 
whole picture for Turkey. The motive to have such a detailed chapter on Turkey is 
coming from the fact that Turkey constitutes the main axis of this dissertation.  
 The fourth chapter includes economic data, graphs and interpretations for my 
sample of countries. Nevertheless, the political side is not neglected and each and 
every economic explanation is backed by a political emphasis. The simultaneous 
transformation is clearly seen from the results which are derived from data analysis. 
However, statistical outcomes concerning inflation, real interest rates and real wages 
highlighted the different results of this simultaneous neo-liberal transformation 
witnessed in two advanced capitalist countries and one peripheral country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Pre-Welfare State 
 
Since the early eighteenth century, the political economic thought has witnessed a 
continual and cumulative transformation. This chapter tries to analyze the essential 
features and basic pillars of the welfare state experienced in the United States, the 
United Kingdom and in Turkey, over the last three decades, and accordingly, the 
liberalization period after the 1980s in the same set of countries. 
 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the exhibited logic for the world 
was a pure liberal approach to economics and politics. “Economic policy primarily 
aimed at the stabilization of prices and was pursued primarily in the form of 
monetary policies.” (Spiegel, 1991: 612). The main concern of the pre-welfare state 
of the twentieth century was inflationary pressures. This necessitated strict monetary 
policy, accompanied by wage cuts and was considered the only appropriate way for 
full employment (Spiegel, 1991: 612).  The theory had been summarized succinctly 
under the so called Say’s Law which states that supply would create its own demand 
(Spiegel, 1991: 612). The significance of this law concerns the prioritization of the 
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supply-side of the economy as being the determinant in calculation of national 
income. 
 Politically speaking, the principle, called laissez faire of Adam Smith was the 
dominant ideology of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in which Smith opposed 
governmental restraints on the economy. The state was to play a minimal role in the 
allocative and distributive spheres. The economy was believed to operate properly if 
the state apparatus remained outside of the free market where individuals were 
seeking their self-interest. The only roles of the government during this classical time 
were external protection, justice, and certain public works such as infrastructure 
(Spiegel, 1991: 256). To sum up, what can be derived from the pre-welfare or liberal 
state period of the eighteenth and nineteenth century is that classical economic and 
political perceptions were dominant in individuals’ self interest and in the state’s role 
in the economy. In other words, there was a liberal aggregation of the economy 
through the principles of price stability and full employment. It was also true for 
politics, by leaving government out of market and identifying it with its ability to 
generate profit. 
 
 
2.2 The Welfare State: Theory and Application  
 
2.2.1 Theoretical Basis and the Performance of the Welfare State 
 
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the fundamental principles of classical 
economics had dominated the agenda of policy makers in terms of their economic 
and political projects. The projects and targets had been shapened until the Great 
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Depression of 1929. But then the theories and principles of Adam Smith and his 
followers could not have been sufficient in explaining the rapid rise in 
unemployment and the crisis of the 1930s. More specifically, the full employment 
principle by which it would be reached via wage cuts was no longer true because 
unemployment rates, particularly for Western countries rose sharply to dramatic rates 
and levels, and, additionally, the market fell into a liquidity constraint (Curwen, 
1997: 4).   
As a result of these deficiencies in the system, a new and critical theory 
emerged to explain what went wrong in the classical economic and political 
approaches. It was in Keynes’s book, entitled, “General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money”, written in 1936. Throughout the book, it was quite clear that 
Keynes himself was proposing an alternative way of looking at economics and 
economic policy. The priorities, diagnose and the proposed remedies for the 
problems of the world economy that had crashed during the1930s were clearly 
outlined in his book.  
The main departure of the Keynesian theory from the previous period 
concerned the terms and pillars of economic targets. As I have outlined, the 
nineteenth century economy in particular revolved around the primacy of price 
stability over any other economic indicators. However, the major target and issue for 
Keynes was not prices, but the rapid rise of unemployment rates that were regarded 
as the direct outcome of the tight monetary policies of the previous era (Curwen, 
1997: 5). The basic and inevitable side effect of these policies was a decline in the 
amount of liquidity in the market. In accordance with the liquidity shortage, interest 
rates increased sharply. Thus, the classical theories of interest rate determination 
became also one of the prominent targets of the Keynesian school.  
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However, more important than these economic implications, Keynes brought 
the expectations issue to the fore. “Keynes felt that decisions with respect to the 
expansion or curtailment of output were to a considerable degree dependent upon the 
prevailing set of expectations about future held by households and firms.” (Curwen, 
1997: 4). The expectations issue gained a remarkable importance in the years 
following after the Great Depression of 1929. Nations were left with idle factories, 
firms and manufacturers; there was a high rate of unemployment so that consumers 
had no disposable income to consume. There was no hope of a recovery in the minds 
of any sector of society. Hence, Keynes saw the expectations issue as an obstacle 
during crisis, and as an obstacle on the way to recovery. 
This emphasis on expectation driven economic analysis issue can be regarded 
as the reason why the Keynesian school has been described as a demand sided one 
(Spiegel, 1991: 612). The underlying logic at the full-employment principle of 
classical economists was believed that the economy operating at full-employment 
was not in need of an analysis of the demand-side. Keynes argued that a market 
economy may fail to operate at a state of full employment and that the economies 
could operate at less than full capacity, the prime mover of economies should be seen 
as the demand side. In other words, unlike the classical liberal theory, Keynes 
believed that in the largest component in the calculation of national income, which 
was the demand side (Spiegel, 1991: 612).   
The political implications of Keynesian economic thought can easily be 
regarded as the revival of the state as an active participant in the economy. Keynes 
asked the question: What if households did not spend their wages and firms did not 
purchase capital machinery in order to increase their sales? If both of them did these 
expected things, then full employment could be reached. But Keynes claimed that 
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expectations shaped the patterns of the households and the corporate sector in their 
saving-investment decisions. In this situation, the economy needed another triggering 
mechanism which could give the economy a chance to recover, and for Keynes it 
was unquestionably the state (Curwen, 1997: 5). When the economy underwent 
recession, Keynes argued that the households and firms might be reluctant to spend 
their earnings. The state should feel responsible for creating demand via public 
spending in order to decrease the unemployment rate. The demand management to 
reduce unemployment rate became the principal target of Keynesian economics 
(Curwen, 1997: 7). The state might become a major entrepreneur, or as Keynes 
stated “the state can represent somewhat comprehensive socialization of investment” 
(Keynes, 1936: 164).  Keynes did not expound public ownership of the means of 
production; rather he deeply believed in the state’s role in the efficient allocation of 
resources (Fletcher, 1989: 178).  
This call of duty for the state in market operations was radically contrary to 
what classical economists had argued as I have stressed above. Another of Keynesian 
concern was the priority given to the principles of equity and efficiency. The 
previous approach to economics was based on the profit motive, even for state affairs 
so that the search for efficiency became vital. In order to generate high levels of 
profit with the lowest amount of input was a basic principal idea of the pre-
Keynesian classical ideology. Accordingly, “efficiency in the market is dependent 
upon the profit motive, and the profit motive has to be subjugated to the wider 
‘public interest’ if equity issues are to be given greater priority.” (Curwen, 1997: 8). 
In contrast, what mattered for Keynes was the realization of equity through the active 
interventions of the state.  
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From the economic and political formulations of Keynes, as the architect of 
welfare state in general, we can summarize the duties of the welfare state as follows: 
 
(i) State provision of social services to individuals or families in 
particular circumstances or contingencies: basically social security, 
health, social welfare, education and training, and housing… 
(ii)  State regulation of private activities (of individuals and 
corporate bodies) which directly alter the immediate conditions of 
life of individuals and groups within the population (Gough, 1992: 
3-4).  
 
The validity and importance of these principles concerning the role of the public 
sector in the welfare state is going to be analyzed in the following section, combined 
with the political economic reasons lying behind the eventual demise of the welfare 
state.  
 
 
 
2.2.2 The Demise of the Welfare State 
  
The legacy of John Maynard Keynes on the political economy orientations of many 
countries, not merely English speaking ones, persisted for decades, particularly 
starting from 1945 to1979. Having affected the major pillars of policies, the welfare 
state faced recoveries, booms and, in the end, crises whose reasons we need to have a 
closer and deeper analysis.  
 As was said before, the major target of the welfare state polices was the 
unemployment problem that had arisen after the Great Depression in the United 
States. The labor market issue and its efficiency were the fundamentals behind nearly 
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all actions undertaken by the legislators of those times. In fact at least until 1970, the 
policies were successful as a way to prevent the undesirable consequences of 
unemployment (Fletcher, 1989: 189).  Even though unemployment rates, especially 
in the developed countries, displayed a decreasing inclination, the outcome was not 
good for inflation rates after 1970. Since the primary goal was to reduce the tension 
in the labor market, the governments paid relatively less attention to the decreasing 
purchasing power of their currencies. The state had a primary role of creating a 
demand in the economy where the private domains could not do so. With the help of 
increasing demand generated in the economy, it was expected to have a decrease in 
unemployment rates. The harmful effect of acting in this manner was that the state 
could not avoid issuing money (Krugman, 1994: 40) in order to finance expenditure 
which was far above budgetary income of the public sector. As an inevitable result, 
inflation levels reached peak levels. 
 Economies started to suffer from a simultaneous rise in unemployment rates 
with an enormous increase in the general price levels. This was in contrast to what 
Keynesian economic theory predicted. Although there were basic propositions 
claiming a trade off between the unemployment and inflation rates, the monetary 
expansion in the market resulted not only in the inflation but in a return to the 
previous experience of unemployment rates. The concurrence of unemployment with 
inflation, called stagflation, began to be observed at the end of 1960 in the developed 
regions of the world (Fletcher, 1989: 190). Economists and political scientists tried to 
explain such a contradictory consequence of welfarist policies. According to most of 
them, one of the possible reasons might be extra market forces, such as sociological 
ones such as severe class struggles between workers and capitalists. The other 
important reason was the monopoly of trade unions on the way to raise wages 
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(Fletcher, 1989: 190) to excessive levels that could not be financed. Though there 
was a demand created by the state apparatus via monetary expansion, the tremendous 
increase in wage levels, which came through the class struggles of the 1960s and 
1970s, forced employers to lay off workers because they could not afford the wages. 
Hence, on the one hand the monetary bases of the economy was enlarging yet on the 
other workers were under the threat of being laid off. 
In addition, the theory of the welfare state failed to respond to the growing 
needs of the public because of the international market players. For instance, the cut 
in annual oil production in 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 by Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) posed a deep threat to those countries which were 
highly dependent upon oil as an energy resource (Curwen, 1997: 11). As a 
consequence, not only did domestic conditions create obstacles for the welfare state 
but the international environment paved the way to consecutive crisis.  
These two reasons, namely stagflation and increases in the prices of energy 
resources are seen as insufficient explanation from the point of the view of some 
conservative thinkers. According to them, the slowdown experienced in productivity 
rates could not only be linked to those reasons and that there were further 
inconsistencies in the basic Keynesian logic itself. First and foremost, they thought 
that advancement and progress in technological processes and devices had come to 
an end because research and development studies had reached their limits. Since 
there was no development in scientific techniques, productivity rate, during the 
1970s, the welfare state would eventually fall (Curwen, 1997: 59). The decline in 
technological progress could be linked to the budgets of the state whose main 
responsibility was to provide free and coherent social security to its citizens. As the 
income generated from taxes reached its limits, as in the case of technology, the state 
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found itself in a great dilemma in terms of allocation of income and redistribution of 
it. 
Another conservative explanation for the crisis of the welfare state was the 
fact that governments had committed a great error in their taxation policies. The 
expansion of social expenditures, as expected from a welfarist state, necessitated 
high levels of taxation generating from both households and firms. According to 
Krugman: 
 
The Social Security system…guarantees a pension to everyone who has 
worked in his or her lifetime. The system became increasingly generous 
during the 1970s, and largely as a result of this generosity the poverty rate 
among the elderly fell sharply (Krugman, 1994: 72). 
 
During the 1970s, there was a growing body of economic analysis that 
attributed the nation’s economic difficulties largely to a basic cause: the 
distortions and reduced incentives caused by taxes and regulations 
(Krugman, 1994: 65). 
 
The tax revenues and highly regulated markets were the basic focus of the 
conservatives, who began to affect policy makers, especially after the late 
seventies, while criticizing the legacy of Keynes in the welfare state 
tradition.  In the next section of this thesis, the emergence and the theoretical 
foundations of this conservatism is analyzed in economic and political 
terms. 
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2.3 Neo-Conservatives In Power: Theory 
 
2.3.1 Neo-Conservative Economics  
 
In this section, the economic reasoning of the conservatives, which found the 
opportunity to rise to power in the early 1980s, is going to be analyzed in order to 
grasp the major departures from the Keynesian economic tradition. As was explained 
before, although the welfare state aimed at eradicating chronic unemployment in the 
world economy, Keynesian theory failed to explain the concurrence of unemployment 
with inflationary pressures on the price levels during the seventies. The monetarist 
school, which provided the theoretical basis for the rise of conservative economics, 
provided a counter argument against the Keynesian school of economics, especially 
on the grounds of policy priorities.  
 Although details of these priorities will be emphasized in the following part of 
the thesis, it is necessary to see the formulas conservatives proposed to remedy 
problems. Firstly, what they offered was the prioritization of the price stability in the 
economy. Unlike Keynesian inflationary policies, the monetarist school had obsessive 
sensitivities over the issue of stable prices. “It contends that the price level is the most 
important economic objective because real variables such as employment can best be 
stimulated in the context of a non-inflationary environment.” (Spiegel, 1991: 12) 
Together with this purpose, the monetarists saw a control over the money supply as 
being the state’s sole instrument in the economy for achieving stable prices: “Hence it 
follows that the growth of the money supply should be geared to the expected growth 
rate of real output…” (Spiegel, 1991: 12). Since there was a trade off between 
inflation and unemployment, the problem of the latter might again come onto the 
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agenda with the implementation of this kind of tight monetary policies. However, 
what the monetarists thought was that “the unemployment that would be created by 
applying monetarist policies would be small and transitional, the unavoidable price 
that had to be paid to get the economy back on a sound footing.” (Gamble, 1988: 41). 
The ‘sound footing’ was obviously the sound money which would no longer create a 
threat to price levels. 
 In addition to this radical departure from the Keynesian tradition, the second 
significant difference between these two mainstream schools of thought concerns the 
determination of the national income. More to the point, as we discussed earlier, 
Keynes thought that income could only be determined via the demand side of the 
economy. Unlike Keynes, monetarists’ concern was towards the supply side which 
was believed to have been neglected during the welfare state period.  
 
[Moentarists] give priority to reawakening enterprise and restoring 
incentives…They urge major reductions in public expenditure and 
taxation as the priority for economic policy, because they believed that it 
is the high taxes social democracy requires financing its programmes that 
is stifling enterprise, depressing productivity, and leading to high inflation 
and high unemployment (Gamble, 1988: 46).  
  
To sum up, what the conservatives focused on are the price stability and the supply-
side of the economy. They saw the solution in the facilitation of these two factors in 
the economy. Nevertheless, it is necessary also to consider the political dimension of 
the conservatives so that we can see the whole picture about what they aimed by 
formulating their theory of economics. 
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2.4 The Rise of Conservative Economics in the Developed Countries   
 
In this part of my thesis, I will be looking at the transformation experienced in the 
developed countries, specifically the United States and the United Kingdom; because 
the most notable impact of economic liberalization trends were initiated in these 
countries. For methodological reasons, the countries will be analyzed individually so 
as to see the details for those countries in terms of what they experienced at the time 
during those fundamental transformations.  
 
 
2.4.1 The United States and the Reagan Administration 
 
Hostility against the system of the welfare state, whose priority was to redistribute 
wealth through expansionist policies, was the primary factor lying behind Reagan’s 
rise to power from the governorship of California within less than a decade. 
Starting from his years of office in California, Reagan was affected by the 
innovative ideas of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman. Particularly, the words of 
Friedman collected in his revolutionary book entitled “Free to Choose”, had an 
important impact on Reagan’s understanding of macroeconomics in general. Being as 
the forerunner and leader of the Chicago School in economics, Milton Friedman 
became a close associate to Reagan (Rayack, 1986: 13). Thus, the theoretical basis of 
Reagan’s economics was constructed by Friedman so his ideas are worth consulting 
comprehensively. 
The obsession to extinguish the inflationary pressures on general price levels, 
as the fundamental idea of Friedman, was the radical element that directed Reagan’s 
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mentality because the experience of inflationary years of the 1970s necessitated 
radical reforms which were formulated to diminish the push on the price levels. The 
sensitivity over price stability occupied the main campaign instrument of Reagan. 
Unlike Keynesian economics of the welfare state, the Reagan presidency relegated 
labor issues below monetary issues. 
 Another criticism claimed by Reagan against the welfare state concerned the 
role of the government in the economy. It was widely known that the interventionist 
characteristic of the American government was shattered by Friedman and Reagan: 
“Not only does it threaten our economic and political freedom, big government has 
slowed economic growth and depressed the productivity.” (Friedman, 1981: 145-
146). In line with this stand, with Reagan’s rise to power, the place of the state in the 
economy was reduced with clear borderlines that meant a return to Adam Smith’s 
regulatory and arbiter state: 
 
Professor Friedman’s political economy is in essence a restatement of the 
classical liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century. His defense 
of a laissez-faire economy and his belief that the scope of government 
should be limited differs little from the economic philosophy expounded 
by Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations, published in 1776 (Rayack, 
1986: 9). 
  
Fiscal policy was intended to be strictly disciplined without any reservations. This 
brought the understanding of a tight fiscal policy which required close supervision of 
government expenditures and transfers. This was quiet necessary because the 
budgetary indicators in the 1970s had begun to erode regarding the expenditures. 
The government was making unsustainable transfer payments with respect to 
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revenues generated from taxes. Thus, President Reagan showed persistent opposition 
to spending, “demanding that Congress produce a balanced budget.”(Rayack, 1986: 
187). By the same token, Friedman was a long time advocate of a constitutional 
amendment that would order a balanced budget, and President Reagan gave strong 
political support to this path to nirvana (Economic Report, 1986: 6-7). That’s why 
the period of Reagan as a product of Friedman was referred to as a return to the 
classics of economics, which meant neo-liberal orthodoxy and a minimal state 
implementing a strong fiscal discipline. 
The choice of monetary policy plan was not totally different from the one for 
fiscal policy. Monetary plans were directed and drafted for the sacred purpose of 
price stability which reflected a war on the inflation created by Keynesian economics 
during welfare state period. Together with his advisers, Reagan blamed inflation on 
one cause: “the FED’s tendency over the past 15 years to let the money supply grow 
faster than the national output.”(Rayack, 1986: 192). Tight monetary policies 
associated with the Fed’s independence were foreseen as permanent remedy to the 
inflationary characteristics of the economy. More specifically, in its Program for 
Economic Recovery, the Reagan administration claimed that it wanted growth rates 
of money and credit to be reduced by 1986 to one-half of those existing in 1980. The 
administration predicted that by 1986 the inflation rate would have fallen to 4.2 %. 
(Campagna, 1994: 85). The major idea derived from these underpinnings of Reagan 
and Friedman’s approach to monetary policies was that the economy would be 
forced to be a supply-sided one because by the fulfillment of tight monetary policy, 
demand in the economy would be diminished to such low levels that the supply side 
would benefit from the decline in wages as a consequence of an increase in the labor 
supply.  
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This clear departure from Keynesian economics as a means to reestablish 
stability in the economy was clear in Reagan plans.  In other words, he would put all 
his efforts into reversing the conditions that gave him the opportunity to be elected 
as president. This is why Reagan put the objectives of his administration as follows: 
 
First, we must cut the growth of Government spending. Second, we must 
cut tax rates so that once again work will be rewarded and saving 
encouraged. Third, we must carefully remove the tentacles of excessive 
government regulation which are strangling our economy. Fourth, while 
recognizing the independence of the institution, we must work with 
federal Reserve Board to develop a monetary policy that will rationally 
control the money supply. Fifth, we must move, surely and predictably, 
toward a balanced budget (US Committee on Budget, 1981-1985: 
3).  
  
More specifically, in the fiscal policies, President Reagan continually proposed a 
wide range of radical reforms to reduce government spending, and therefore cut the 
large deficits. According to him, high priority programs should remain adequately 
financed, unnecessary programs eliminated, and other programs reduced to a more 
appropriate scale. He believed that the programs which could be better done by the 
private sector should be shifted there, and services better provided by the state and 
local governments should be transferred (Boskin, 1987: 117).  In other words, 
Reagan announced the priorities and preferences of his administration. The list of the 
Reagan administration shaped the budgetary indicators of the USA radically. While 
doing this, the primary objective was to achieve a balanced budget by decreasing the 
amount of government expenditures or diminishing the ‘unnecessary’ needs of the 
nation. For example, funds allocated for education, training, employment and social 
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services declined from 5.4% to 3.2% of general budget. Similarly and more 
decisively, the funds for community and region development decreased from 19.0% 
to 0.5% (Campagna, 1994: 69). Both units included welfare programs like 
unemployment insurance, family assistance programs and Medicaid, etc.. In contrast, 
“national defense spending rose to 26.5 % of total outlays, up from 22.7% in 1980, 
an increase of over 68%. Most of these increases [were] accounted for by increases 
in research and development, for example, star wars fantasies.”(Campagna, 1994: 
69). 
The results of tight fiscal policy did not, however, conform to Reagan’s 
expectations. In fact, under his presidency, “the nation [saw] unprecedented 
peacetime deficits, resulting in a $2 trillion national debt, a debt twice the size of that 
when he took the office.” (Campagna, 1994:69).  Hence, although the Reagan 
administration did not succeed in reducing the size of government spending, it 
managed to alter the composition of that spending. 
The story for taxation policies was not different from the one for budgetary 
processes. Since orthodox economists like Friedman and president Reagan worried 
about high and rising tax rates, even more for corporate investment, the tax cuts were 
a major concern for Reagan. He proposed dramatic reforms like a rapid reduction of 
marginal personal income-tax rates rapidly and the making of saving investments 
universal (Boskin, 1987: 140). While implementing these tax reforms, “the intention 
was to have a rise in the real net rate of investment, and the growth performance.” 
(Boskin, 1987: 145).  In other words, the reduction in personal and corporate tax 
rates was the heart and soul of supply-side economics which he argued that “these 
reductions would awaken the sleeping giant of U.S capitalism.” (Rayack, 1986: 174) 
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However, the results of the tax cuts did not follow what the Reagan administration 
expected when they put those policies into effect (Rayack, 1986: 174). 
The fiscal policy that Reagan pursued during his term of office failed in all its 
aims. However, the fact that the failure of this fiscal policy did not have any 
economic impacts on the USA economy but makes us think about the real intent 
behind neoclassical or conservative policies: the assault on government spending and 
taxes was in essence an assault on social spending, an assault largely directed at the 
poor and disadvantaged, an assault on those who were not so free to choose, as 
Rayack claimed in his book (Rayack, 1986: 190).  
The Reagan administration placed high priority on monetary policy issues 
which were blamed as the major causes of the high inflation and real interest rates 
produced by Keynesian economic policies. That’s why “a gradual reduction of 
inflation to a level where it was no longer a major threat in economic decisions was 
considered desirable and a necessary prerequisite to restoring incentives to produce 
income and wealth.” (Boskin, 1987: 52). Unlike in welfare state economics, which 
did not give priority to price stability or to monetary growth, the money supply was 
closely kept under surveillance in order to decrease the velocity of money in the 
economy, which was believed to be a leading factor for stable development (Boskin, 
1987: 53).  These monetarist views, formulated by Milton Friedman, appeared first 
in the campaign of Reagan in which he declared that “the economy was out of 
control and had to be subdued; interest rates must come down, and inflation must be 
brought under control. Accordingly, a tighter monetary policy was necessary.” 
(Campagna, 1994: 86). 
The results of the monetarist mode of economics under the Reagan regime 
should be analyzed with respect to the sequence of his terms of presidency.  For the 
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first term between 1980 and 1984, the monetary authorities managed to diminish the 
monetary base to the desired levels. To illustrate, the growth rate of money dropped 
from 16.9% in 1980 to 3.8% in 1984. Inflation rates exhibited the same pattern of 
tendency with a decline from 12.4% to 4.0% (Campagna, 1994: 87-88). So, in the 
first term, the administration achieved what it wanted in terms of monetary policy 
targets but, unfortunately, it had not foreseen the social costs of such a policy. Since 
real interest rates did not show a decline, investment expenditures fell to levels lower 
than the 1970s. Thus, “the unemployment rate rose steadily and sharply from 7.2% 
in April 1981 to a high of 10.7% in November 1983.” (Rayack, 1986: 192). It 
becomes clear that in the battle against inflation, not everyone was called to duty, 
meaning that the lower income groups were obliged to sacrifice for the benefit of the 
nation.  
However, things began to alter in the second term of office for the Reagan 
administration. A recovery started in 1984 and lasted throughout the remainder of his 
presidency. For example, the unemployment rate gradually fell to 7.4% in 1985, and 
eventually to 5.4% in 1988. The inflation rate was kept at about 3.8% until it rose 
again to 4.4% in 1987 and 1988. The figures concerning the growth rate of money 
did not reflect what monetarists predicted or theorized about. More to the point, the 
inflation rate of  3.8% in 1984 fluctuated between 4.3% and 15.3% during Reagan’s 
second term (Campagna, 1994: 92). Thus, the monetarist claim which argued a direct 
proportional relation between monetary accommodation and price levels failed to 
explain this trend in the United States.  
I tried to give the main points of economic policy and political aspects of the 
Reagan administration. The point concerned the monetarist school of economics for 
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whatever reason; monetarism’s credibility was badly damaged after its failure under 
the Reagan regime between 1984 and 1988. 
Even though the success of Reagan administration in economic policy is 
ambiguous as the results of policies in his two terms of office are different, the 
clearest effect of his presidency is the struggle against the basic legacies of the 
welfare state. While the administration was ‘balancing’ the figures in the budget and 
prices, their policy variables created ‘imbalances’ for the working people of the 
nation. 
 
 
2.4.2 The United Kingdom and Thatcherism 
  
The need to analyze what happened in the United Kingdom (UK) emanates from the 
fact that though the country had experienced a similar transformation like that of the 
United States, it exhibited some differences and originalities with respect to the 
policies implemented and the priorities made. Since nearly all necessary theoretical 
explanations have been provided already in discussing the United States, while 
analyzing the United Kingdom, the emphasis will be put on merely what was done in 
order to rescue the economy from the problems created by the welfare state tradition. 
 Like the United States, “the 1970s were a time of major and repeated crises in 
the UK economy.” (Curwen, 1987: 318).  More specifically, the economy was in a 
vicious circle of inflation and unemployment, like the United States. As a result of 
this damaging crisis, a change in government occurred in the UK as well. The 
Conservative Party won the elections with a landslide victory under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher. The reasons that brought Thatcher to the power were hidden in 
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the lines of her election manifesto, published in 1979: “Our country’s relative 
decline is not inevitable. We in the Conservative party think that we can reverse it. 
We want to work with the grain of the human nature, helping people to help 
themselves… The Conservative Government’s first job will be to rebuild our 
economy…” (Gamble, 1988: 96). 
 As can be easily grasped from the manifesto, Thatcher’s primary purpose was 
to stimulate the economy, which was in crisis. Together with her approaches to 
economic principles, Thatcherism in politics dominated the entire decade from 1980. 
The principal features of her approach were as follows: 
1) The necessity of eradicating inflation is of fundamental importance, not only 
for its own sake but because of its effects on the level of unemployment.” 
(Curwen, 1987: 322). Like the United States, stagflation -the coexistence of 
inflation and unemployment- was also the case in the UK so that Thatcher’s 
conservative government sought to remedy the problem. What they pursued 
regarding this aim was quite similar to what Reagan did in his term of office. 
It was “the Monetary cure for inflation before the onset of recession [that] it 
persevered with the policy even when the severity of the recession became 
apparent.” (Gamble, 1988: 98).  
2) The policies destined for exercising control over the money supply and the 
provision of a stable non-inflationary framework, meant to be a strict 
monetarist for Thatcher administration. Like the Reagan administration, the 
Thatcher government imposed severe restrictions on the expansion of the 
monetary base.   
3) “Free market supply-side policies constitute the main weapons for tackling 
unemployment and raising the rate of growth of output.” (Curwen, 1987: 
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322). The emphasis given to the demand side by the welfare state shifted to 
the supply side of the economy as a remedy to the chronic problems of the 
economy in the UK. Supply-side economics included “tax cuts to boost 
incentives, privati[z]ation and deregulation to extract the State and its 
agencies from economy…” (Curwen, 1987: 322). The political definition of 
the role of the state in the UK can be easily grasped from this proposal of 
Thatcher Conservative government. It should be as minimal as possible so 
that, like the United States, free market operations would be realized more 
efficiently and effectively.  
 
These were the basic policy aims of the neo-conservatives and they were 
immediately executed. The results of the Thatcher administration’s policies should 
also be analyzed to assess the accomplishments and failures. While doing this, 
monetarist policies of the Thatcher government will be analyzed with respect to her 
two main terms of office, namely 1979-1982 and 1982-1987. 
 In the first term, the government started to restructure the burden of taxation. 
While “the rate of Value Added Tax was almost doubled, income tax was reduced 
from 33 to 30 percent.” (Gamble, 1988: 99). In the context of tight monetary policies 
and a supply-side economy, public expenditure was cut by £1.5 billion and since 
annual cash limits were limited also, the reduction reached £2.5 billion by a further 
£1 billion reduction (Gamble, 1988: 99). The result of these monetarist polices was a 
clear recession which deepened during 1980.  
 
High interest rates and soaring oil prices combined to push up sterling by 
12 per cent…A mounting wave of bankruptcies, plant closures, and lay-
offs was the result. Unemployment rose rapidly month by month. By the 
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end of the year it had reached 2.13 million, an increase of 836.000. 
Inflation was soaring too, peaking at 21.9 per cent in May 1980 
(Gamble, 1988: 101). 
  
The statistics for Thatcher’s first term supported the argument above. Inflation 
reached 11.2 per cent from 8 per cent in 1979; the unemployment rate rose to 8.4 per 
cent whereas real GDP growth declined to 1 per cent from 2.3 per cent in the same 
year (Curwen, 1987: 326).  In a time when the economy was in a severe recession, 
Thatcher raised the pay of the police and army by substantial amounts, as her 
manifesto had promised and the budget for defense was enlarged remarkably 
(Gamble, 1988: 105). As was seen before, the same thing happened in the United 
States as well in order to strengthen the defensive powers of the state. 
  However, things began to change in Thatcher’s second term (1982-1987). 
According to Gamble, “these years were golden years for Conservatives.” (Gamble, 
1988: 110). The main reason for this recovery was mainly due to the same trend 
experienced in the United States, as was explained earlier. As supply-side economics 
reached its peak in the United States, it created demand in the world economy which 
contributed to the recovery of the United Kingdom (Gamble, 1988: 111). With 
respect to this recovery period, the rise in the unemployment rate declined and 
inflation fell sharply. To illustrate, inflation rates decreased to 4.7 per cent and the 
real GDP growth rate rose to 3.5 percent (Curwen, 1987: 326).   
 In terms of the role of the state in this transformation and its place in the 
economy, it can be easily said that all necessary actions were undertaken by the 
Thatcher government in order to keep the state out of the economy, except for its 
role in defense. In accordance with the manifesto of 1979 and developed bilateral 
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relations with the United States, as a result of an alliance against the former Soviet 
Union, military expenditures reached a peak under Thatcher’s rule. 
 What we can derive from this condensed account of the transformation in the 
United Kingdom is that, like the United States, the Thatcher administration led to 
severe recession in the economy for the first four years and the burden was paid by 
poor sections of the society, again. Another similarity with the United States was the 
extensive use of state mechanisms to reverse the downturn in the economy. More to 
the point, although the policies were directed towards excluding the state from the 
economy, they were implemented by the direct involvement of the state itself 
through its agents. The active role of the state in the transformation of these 
developed countries is going to be analyzed in relation to Turkey in order to observe 
their transition to neo-conservative economic principles. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
The Transformation of Political Economy in Turkey 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Life in Turkey, damaged by crisis and downturns leading to significant 
transformations in politics, has found itself in turmoil since the time of late Ottoman 
Empire. Misalignment between the expectations from the implemented economic 
and political policies and their outcomes led to a deterioration of relations among the 
classes of Turkish society. Although the policies themselves were designed to 
achieve terrific targets, their impacts on the composition of the classes were never 
favorable, specifically from the view of workers.  
 In this chapter of my thesis, I attempt to figure out the relationship between 
the transformations experienced after 1960 and their effects on different segments of 
the society. The fundamental questions I will answer are as follows: “what are the 
basic pillars of the transformations?”, “what do they mean for social classes and 
especially, “For whom the policies are implemented?” and “What are the political 
motives lying behind the economic projects conducted during the period in 
question?”. In other words, the political economic affiliations in Turkey for the last 
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decades are put under scrutiny so as to incorporate political, economic and 
sociological aspects into my historical analysis.  
 The method I utilized during the preparation of this chapter is a mixed form 
of both historical and interpretative approaches. In terms of historical analysis, I 
divided the paper into three periods: pre-liberalization (1960-1980), liberalization 
(1980-1987) and post-liberalization (1987-2001). For the interpretative approach, I 
try my best to find the ideas between the lines and the logic behind the statistical 
observations and derivations. Since I would like to write in a condensed and intense 
way, I give solely the crucial points which could themselves be the individual 
subjects of other thesis. In a nutshell, I try to give a varied version of this long history 
in an interdisciplinary style, composed of economics, politics and sociology. 
 
 
 
3.2 The Pre-liberalization Period (1960-1980)   
 
3.2.1 Industrialization as a Remedy 
 
Severe economic crisis under Democrat Party rule (1950-1960), especially 
concerning the current account balance, made the system paralyzed because 
production came to a halt in Turkey. As a result of international aid flows coming 
from the United States under Marshall Plan, Turkey lacked all of its productive 
capacities, except agriculture. In other words, the industrial production centers, 
which could have enhanced the growth of the country, seemed to be paralyzed. This 
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was why there emerged diversified opinions on how to enrich the productive 
capacity of Turkey in terms of industrial matters.  
Among the alternative proposals, “a coalition of interests which had emerged 
on the eve of the 1960 coup believed that the solution to Turkey’s chronic problems 
lay in industrialization.” (Barkey, 1990: 60). The priority given to industrialization 
stemmed from Turkey’s over-dependency on foreign goods except food, textiles and 
steel manufacturing (Zürcher, 2001: 386). Actually, the importation of goods, which 
had been increased to incredible amounts under Democrat Party regime, reached 
unsustainable levels. It was unsustainable because the deficit could only be financed 
via international aid flows and exportation. However, the former became reluctant to 
transfer money and the latter solution could not be realized only by exporting 
agricultural products.   
The international markets did not wish to be involved in the paralyzed system 
of Turkey. Therefore, the core of the industrialization project was the domestic 
market and its effectiveness in the determination of economic behaviors. Mainly due 
to this, this time period was called “inward-oriented industrialization”. There were 
some significant features of this preference: 
 
• Planning: Economic and political decisions were taken with respect to the 
planning principle. Almost all investment projects and other expenditure 
policies were subject to this ultimate planning because they should give 
reference to the five-year plans formulated by newly-established State 
Planning Organization together with government actions (Boratav, 1995: 94). 
Public investment should be organized in line with the points declared in the 
planning projects. In the same sense, private investments could be granted 
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and subsidized by the state if and only if they acted in compliance with the 
points in the plan (Boratav, 1995: 118). The most important consequence of 
such intensive planning of economic transactions was that the state became 
highly involved in the market in terms of its allocative and distributive targets 
and policies. The public authorities carried out an intense surveillance 
concerning all investment projects and initiatives so as to satisfy the 
predictions of the plan. As I explained in the previous chapter, this is a basic 
reflection of a Keynesian economic model and Turkey, like other developed 
countries, implemented the same model in the same time periods. 
 
• Shift in Consumption Preferences: When compared to the previous periods 
in Turkey, consumption habits altered radically. Particularly, a major change 
arose from the intense use of white durable goods like washing machines, 
refrigerators (Boratav, 1995: 118). Thus, transition to industrialization 
became an absolute necessity in order to satisfy consumer demand because, 
according to Boratav, the tendencies and preferences of those consumers 
gained enormous significance as they were dominant in the decision making 
processes of the country. Since the importation of those goods could easily 
deteriorate the already damaged current account balance, the project was to 
produce them in the domestic markets with domestic means of production, 
though also with the incorporation of international capital, in the form of oil, 
for example.  Moreover, the existing economic structure, shaped by 
agricultural revenues, could not cope with this change in the content of the 
consumers’ demand. Eventually, the industrialization strategy generated 
contrary outcomes to the ex ante expectations. More to the point, high 
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dependency on foreign raw and intermediary materials, like oil, could not 
allow the Turkish economy to avoid being a simple function of the 
international economic and political conjuncture. While the domestic market 
was the motor of the economy, the grease for it came not from national but 
international resources. As a result the industrial sectors could not compete 
with international actors as they were inward-oriented and outward-dependent 
(Boratav, 1995: 119). 
 
• Political Regime: The post-1960 coup political regime is mainly described in 
the literature as a significant instance of a populist one (Boratav, 1995:99). 
Why was it called populist? First of all, the government and its executive 
apparatus were caught between the demands of both the capitalists, who were 
the major actors of industrialization project, and the workers as the choosers 
of the government composition in the elections. Although the government 
served the ultimate needs of the capitalist class via fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies, it was also highly sensitive to the demands of the workers. In other 
words, the governments of this period composed their policy variables in 
such a way that they could fulfill the long-term interests of the industrial 
capitalist class and the short term demands of the workers. This was a kind of 
‘balancing’ project.  
The Import Substitution Industrialization strategy (ISI) was a simple product 
of this balance. Since the objective of ISI was to avoid the harmful impacts of 
imported goods on the economy, inward-orientedness and the domestic 
market became the considerations in policy making. The industrial capitalist 
class, as mentioned above, was encouraged and supported by the executive 
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apparatus for the final purpose of industrialization. Meanwhile, the workers 
had a relatively privileged status in policy-making because wages spent by 
the workers were the cogs of the market machine. Specifically, wages, unlike 
in other time periods of Turkey, began to have two major functions: The first 
one, as is accepted widely in economics, had something to do with the costs 
for capitalists. However, secondly, they were the forerunners of the domestic 
demand which was quite remarkable for a country to be able to implement ISI 
policies. Statistically speaking, real wages (adjusted to 1963 prices) in Turkey 
had tended to increase from 1960 to 1978 (Yeldan, 2002: 69).  
The increase in the real wages could not be linked merely to the political 
regime’s prioritization of a lively domestic market. The legislative 
environment; the constitutional provisions, laws and regulations; allowed the 
workers to organize politically on the basis of class interests as an opposition 
to the capitalist class. Turkey, for the first time in its history, began to witness 
strikes, struggles and demonstrations against unfavorable policies imposed on 
workers’ wages. This was another important reason why we observed a 
radical increase in the real wage shortly after each and every decrease 
(Yeldan, 2002: 69).  
Another feature of the populist political regime in Turkey was its very 
advanced social security system (Boratav, 1995: 100). There was a wide 
range of social security tools changing from education to Medicaid. The 
working class, as a result of these advanced social security programs, 
benefited not only from high real wages but also by means of other in-kind 
transfers generated from health, education and some other infrastructure 
sectors.  
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Hence, it can be said that the state had an important role in the transformation 
experienced in the post 1960 coup period. By drafting out the new strategy as 
industrialization and encouraging domestic production while discouraging the 
importation, the state was in the center of policies and their implementations. 
Industrialization project of the state can be seen in the statistical numbers concerning 
sectoral breakdown of GNP. To illustrate, while the agriculture produced 37.9 % of 
GNP in 1960, it was 22.6 % for industry and construction. In 1970, share of 
industrial production jumped to 28.9 % whereas agricultural contribution decreased 
to 26.2 %. Eventually, agriculture continued to decline under even 22 %, but 
industrial sector began to produce 31.5 % of GNP in 1978 (Akbank, 1980: 50). 
Additionally, while the consumer, intermediary and investment (capital) goods 
occupied 57.2 %, 31.0 % and 11.8 % of manufacturing industry in 1967, the figures 
changed in such a fashion that the first became 42.1 %, second 41. 0 % and the 
capital good output reached 16 % in 1978 (World Bank, 1980: 306). 
Regarding workers’ status in society, the role of the state was very significant 
due to its balancing project which produced populist political regime. In other words, 
the Turkish state during the 1960s and 1970s was both a producer and consumer in 
the market for the sake of deriving equilibrium between the clashing interests of 
capitalists and workers. 
 
 
3.2.2 The Decline of the Model  
 
The statistical findings accorded well with the expectations until the end of 1960s 
and Turkey had caught a trend of growth. Although the very same story persisted 
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from 1973 to 1977, with an average growth rate of 14.2 percent per annum as an 
achievement of the third five-year plan and as a result of the remittances coming 
from Turkish workers abroad, the foreign debt allocated to finance imported 
intermediary goods (oil, machines...etc.) reached unsustainable accumulating 
external debt which was the beginning of the end of the heyday years in Turkish 
political and economic history of the 1970s. The inward-oriented and externally 
dependent model generated contrary consequences to expectations due to both its 
internal inconsistencies and inadequacies of political actors in Turkey. According to 
Sevket Pamuk (1981: 28-29) 
   
  …contradictions manifest themselves in two different forms, depending 
  upon the characteristics of the peripheral social formation and the nature 
  of its ties to the capitalist world: either as a market crisis or as a foreign 
  exchange crisis…But the domestic market in Turkey has been a major 
  force behind the industrial accumulation and the contradictions of import 
  substitution industrialization have manifested themselves in the second 
  form, through periodic foreign exchange reserves.  
  
The ISI model has its own deficiencies in terms of its initial projects, intermediary 
steps and consequences. As explained above, the initial projects of ISI are to increase 
the industrial production capacity of the country through large and intensive 
investment plans. One of the most important components of this initial project is to 
produce for domestic market and to block the importation of final products via tariffs 
and other trade barriers. It is believed that the domestic market can finance 
industrialization and this can lead to the enhancement of a domestic industrial 
bourgeoisie. Protectionism of domestic producers prepares a suitable ground for 
them to develop their industrial activities and expand employment opportunities in 
  34 
the economy. However, there are some crucial intermediary steps for the initial 
projects to be realized. For example, the quality of products should transform from 
consumption goods to capital goods. In other words, although at the outset, the 
domestic factories work for consumption goods, in time they should begin to produce 
capital goods which can produce consumption goods. The shift from the former to 
the latter is not so easy: it needs research and development strategies, high-quality 
workers and raw materials like steel, iron, wood and oil. This is why it is hard  to 
start to produce capital goods.  
Another intermediary step, very linked to the first step, is the launch of an 
exportation program. This step is so significant because importation of raw materials 
can only be financed through export revenues. But the producer who is under the 
strong protection of government policies and can generate high profits from domestic 
sales becomes reluctant to take the risks involved in exportation. The low quality of 
products and the lack of capital goods put other obstacles in the way of projects of 
ISI. As a consequence, protectionism of producers constitutes a major inconsistency 
of ISI which had been premature due to the reasons explained above. Hence a crisis 
seems to be inevitable for an underdeveloped country which, like Turkey, employed 
populist policies while being dependent on foreign raw materials.        
 In addition to the effects of a crisis, there were three other components vis a 
vis the industrial capitalist class. At the outset, there was deterioration in distribution 
of national income*. As I explained in the previous paragraphs, politically organized 
workers increased their demands for higher wages and more social security. Turkey’s 
political turmoil, a result of frequently formed and dissolved coalition governments, 
prevented the authorities from coping with these demands in order not to lose votes. 
                                                 
* For a comprhensive analysis please see: Özbudun, Ergun, and Aydın Ulusan. The Political 
Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey.  New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980. 
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In the end, the industrial capitalist class was convinced “of the necessity of 
reorganizing the labor market on authoritarian lines.”(Turel, Boratav, 1994: 214)  
Second, the flow of the workers’ remittances which allowed the governments 
to finance the deficits began to be removed from domestic financial institutions due 
to a lack of credibility of Turkey’s financial status as the international market players 
continually refused to provide credits to a politically unstable and financially unfit 
country. Finally, there was a political crisis for the industrial capitalist class as it 
drifted away from the center of decision-making processes with the rise of both 
Islamic capitalists (the National Salvation Party electoral base) and leftist 
governments’ sensitive concerns over the workers’ demands. Thus, the bourgeoisie 
began to lose its “domination over the state and specifically over economic decision-
making…” (Turel, Boratav 1994: 216)  
 Regarding international business cycle theories, the first OPEC oil crisis of 
1974 was not taken into account seriously by Turkish governments. The elections, 
ISI strategy requirements (like cheap foreign exchange rates) and workers’ 
remittances were the basic reasons for populist governments’ negligent attitudes 
towards the oil crisis. There were no rational anti-crisis precautions against the 
harmful impacts of the rise in oil prices.  It was logical to expect a huge downturn in 
the economy. This was why the second oil shock of 1977 and 1979 affected the 
Turkish economy more deeply than in other countries. 
  Consequently, the policies implemented during the pre-liberalization period 
could not achieve the ultimate targets designed and expected by the planners and 
authorities due to both political, economic factors observed domestically and 
internationally and inborn inconsistencies lying behind the system of ISI. The 
industrial capitalist class benefited from the industrialization strategy which was 
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carried out under ISI policies. As a result of high protection for the domestic 
producers and barriers against the importation of final products, together with tax and 
direct incentives, the industrial bourgeoisie became the clear championing class of 
these times. The emergence of the first conglomerates like Sabanci, Koc and OYAK 
was not a simple coincidence. These domestic brands were a result of protectionist 
policies. 
 On the other hand, the socio-economic situation of the working class 
exhibited a different even a mirror image path from that the industrial capitalist class 
followed. At first glance, it seemed as if the workers had a great influence over the 
decision-making process, and this was partly true until the end of the first oil-shock 
in 1974. However, through the effects of the first stand-by program signed with 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the wage levels were dramatically repressed so 
as to decrease the inflationary pressures on general price levels. To illustrate, real 
wages (adjusted to 1963 prices) showed an increasing trend until 1975 whereas, from 
that year to 1987, they tended to fall. In contrast to this deterioration in real wages, 
the mark-up rates (profit rates of private manufacturing industry as a whole) of the 
industrial capitalist class, even under the IMF program, showed an increasing trend 
(Yeldan, 2002: 69). According to Celasun and Rodrik (1987), the gross government 
salaries and wages constituted a share of 9 % of GNP in 1980 but they decreased to 6 
% in 1985.  
As a conclusion, the inward-orientedness which was linked to the import 
substitution strategy was not able to change the composition of the Turkish economy. 
High dependency on foreign raw materials, inability to shift from consumption goods 
to capital goods, being reluctant to export because of high profits in the domestic 
market and the consequent lack of international competitiveness and effect of the 
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business cycles made Turkey return to its starting point with high external debts, 
inflation and rising unemployment with a paralyzed industry.  
 
3.3 The Liberalization Period (1980-1987) 
 
 
3.3.1 Economic Assessment  
 
The inward-oriented, protectionist, import substitutive projects and “balancing” 
populist governments could not provide sound remedies to the problems of Turkey 
between 1960 and 1980:  
   
  Turkish economic thinking is stricken with a chronic illness; the  
  bureaucracy and intelligentsia envisage economic life as being totally  
  subordinated to social and cultural goals, whereas the promoters of  
  private enterprise ignore the social and human aspects of economic  
  problems. Practically all economic thinking revolves around these two 
  ideas in a vicious circle that can be broken only by initiating a growth  
  from  below, involving the masses in the economic process and giving  
  them a sense of participation by actual sharing in benefits.   
  (Karpat, 1964: 69) 
 
The country found itself in the midst of threats coming from both domestic and 
external economic indicators which had their own effects in the deterioration of 
Turkish economy: “With rapidly declining exchange reserves, rising import bills, and 
debt-servicing payments, the Turkish economy was thrown into a full-fledged 
payments crisis, which brought about a total collapse of its credit worthiness in 
international markets.”(Çeçen, Doğruel S., Doğruel F., 1994: 44). In addition to this 
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loss of external credibility, workers in the country acquired an advantageous position 
in the eyes of the capitalist class because they utilized all their constitutional rights so 
as to enhance their situation. As Tachau and Heper (1983:24) claimed,  
   
  Turkish Politics in the 1970s was thus characterized by fragmentation  and 
  by a lack of decisive authority on the part of the government. Polarization 
  come to characterize not only the parties, but was insinuated into other 
  important social  sectors as well, including organized labor, the teaching 
  profession, the civil bureaucracy and, even the police. 
  
This was why the capitalist class explicitly started to submit to the government their 
requests to halt this trend experienced in the labor market. In order to restore the loss 
of credibility and reinstitutionalize the state’s power in the labor market, the Demirel 
government announced a program on January 24 1980 which was designed to divert 
the economy towards market-oriented, export-led and minimal state principles. The 
major argument behind the measures, whose architect was Turgut Özal, was the fact 
that “Turkey could not export anything under these relatively high real wages so that 
putting them under strict control was an obvious requisite for Turkey to generate 
remedies to its chronic problems like inflation.” (Boratav, 1995: 121). As can be 
understood from the main arguments of the package, Turkey began to change its path 
in terms of not only economic principles but also political and social ones. The 
priorities, choices and preferences of the country were subject to newly-formulated 
proposals, which were quite in line with the industrialist capitalist class of Turkey.  
 
 
 
  39 
3.3.1.1 Important Points of the 24 January Measures  
 
Since the ideas of 24 January Measures were decisively implemented until 1987, it is 
necessary to look at these measures in order to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the liberalization period. There were three main legs which encompassed the 
essence of the measures: 
 
a) To improve the balance of payments and raise  international competitiveness: The 
principle about increasing the international competitiveness of the domestic 
producers was the core of the packet. Referring to the previous section of this 
chapter, it can be noticed that especially the manufacturing industry remained 
premature as a result of the high protection provided by the state. The premature 
feature of the industrial productive units made Turkey isolated from international 
trade operations. Since the domestically oriented political and economic regime 
could not achieve the fulfillment of the ultimate purpose of the ISI strategy, which 
was the exportation of nationally produced goods, the industrial capitalists utilized 
foreign exchange reserves which were not generated by their own efforts but by the 
state’s official reserves fed via external borrowing.  
Turgut Özal himself believed that the economy should operate for 
international markets so as to solve the foreign exchange shortage and inflationary 
pressures on the price levels (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 40). The deficit in the balance of 
payments was believed to be the major reason for the inability of the country to have 
a stable economy. The opportunities to finance the deficit came to an end.  
Since Turkey could not compete in the international market with the low 
quality its products, the only way to acquire a comparative advantage against the rest 
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of the world was to have price competitiveness. Hence, on the way to increase the 
international competitiveness of Turkish private manufacturing industry, the first and 
foremost action undertaken by the Demirel government was a radical devaluation of 
the Turkish Lira with respect to foreign exchanges. The rate was increased from 47 
TL per dollar to 70 TL per dollar (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 40).  
 The second action undertaken under the reforms concerned the export-led 
growth strategy. Unlike the previous period, the state with all its agents and organs 
began to encourage those employers who were producing directly for international 
markets. In other words, the state altered its priority towards the ones who work for 
competitive international markets. “All of the country’s major export promotion 
schemes, including indirect tax rebates, preferential export credit, and duty-free 
allocations of foreign exchange to pay for imported intermediate inputs were greatly 
expanded. It is estimated that direct subsidies rose to about 23 percent of the value of 
exports in 1983.” (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 40). A dramatic increase in the amount of 
export credit was observed in the economy. While the government gave 15.157 
million TL credit to the exporters in 1977, it raised to 479.767 million TL in 1981 
and 1.576.894 million TL in 1986 (Öniş, Özmucur, 1988). Accompanied by the 
devalued Turkish lira and other incentives, the export capitalists were now on the 
scene as the motor for the economy to function properly in line with the free market 
principles.  
 The last reform action was taken against the trade regime of the ISI strategy. 
The protectionist and illiberal trade barriers were seen as the main causes of the 
improper operation of the Turkish economy. The trade regime and importation was 
liberalized: “The shift from a system which specified what could be imported to one 
which specified what could not be imported led to a liberalization of trade in a wide 
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array of products.” (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 40).  But this reform proceeded more 
gradually than the former reform actions because the idea at the outset was to 
facilitate the exportation capacity of the country. More to the point, importation was 
thought of as a function of the exportation.  The results of these three reform actions 
in terms of the export capacity of Turkey have been evaluated as a success when 
compared to other countries particularly in the early stages of implementation.  
 
b) To combat inflation: The transition of Turkey to neo-liberal orthodoxy in its 
economic policies can be best understood from its sensitivity to price levels in the 
market. In other words, as the country drifted away from its Keynesian foundation 
and moved to neo-liberal policies, the economic targets and goals changed radically. 
The insistence on importance of the price levels was a clear instance of this 
transformation.     
Since Turkey’s international credibility deteriorated in the last years of the 
1970s, external borrowing reached its limits so the populist governments of the 
previous period had to cover deficits in the budget by printing money. The market 
had now a larger monetary base than it needed and the reflection of this excess 
supply on the general price levels of the country was inevitable.  The problem of 
inflation intensified under these circumstances, specifically in the last years of the 
1970s.  
The measures announced in the 24 January Packet were to offer tight 
monetary and fiscal policies in order to lower the general price levels in the market. 
The word “stability” entered the jargon of economic policies in Turkey. To keep 
price levels stable and the budget in balance, all the expenditure unit of accounts 
were decreased, whereas income units were increased to enormous levels. The peak 
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inflation rate reached more than 100 percent in 1980. However, through tight fiscal 
and monetary policies it fell to 36.6 percent in 1981, 30.8 in 1982 and 32.9 in 1983. 
But, increasing public sector deficits created by the election policies of Özal’s 
government led to another monetary expansion and another rise in the inflation rate 
to average levels of 40 percent between 1980 and 1987 (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 43).  
 
c) To give priority to the private sector in the economy: As explained in the previous 
section, production facilities in the industrial sectors of Turkey had come to halt and 
were paralyzed. The 24 January Measures took this problem very seriously that there 
were many policies implemented to stimulate the productive capacity of Turkey. In 
accordance with the significance given to the price stability, the most harmful effect 
of the inflation rates was believed to be effective in the private investment levels of 
the 1960-1980 periods. The accommodated deficits in 1970s created an atmosphere 
in which the entrepreneurs could not foresee the future prices as the prices at every 
sector, without exceptions, rose to unexpected levels. The private investment 
initiatives reached their deepest rates in the Turkish economic history. 
 In line with the propositions of neo-liberal orthodoxy, deregulation and 
privatization were taken as effective remedies to chronic problems in industry. In this 
sense, entrepreneurship and the shift of ownership from public to private were to be 
encouraged by the governments in the post 1980 period.  By doing this, it was 
thought that not only would the level of private investments increase to an extent 
which could satisfy the needs of the country, but also unemployment rates would 
decline to the estimated levels of the program. 
 The Özal government with its absolute majority in parliament was the 
forerunner of this deregulation and privatization project. Starting from the very first 
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day of his administration, Özal was eager to undertake an extensive privatization 
project but it could not be implemented because of legal problems and bureaucratic 
and social reactions coming from opponents to Özal’s government (Öniş, Riedel, 
1993: 44).    
 
 
3.3.2 Political Assessment 
 
Turgut Özal was the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry during Demirel’s 
government and, as expressed before, he was the architect of the 24 January 
Measures in 1980. Until the military coup on 12 September 1980, both Demirel’s and 
Özal’s ideas about restructuring the economy in accordance with the measures could 
not be applied because the workers were strong enough to resist the radical reforms 
which brought disadvantageous decisions for wage earners. The legal environment 
allowed them to take strong actions against governments. Hence, the points I 
discussed about 24 January Measures were not easily executed because of this strong 
opposition of workers.  
Therefore, the regime change on 12 September 1980 conducted by a military 
coup became crucial for the implementation of the reforms. Martial laws and 
restrictions on unionization, strikes and other kinds of demonstrations were 
instantaneously introduced by the junta regime because  
  
 the crisis which spawned the 1980 military intervention in Turkey was 
  multi-faceted, including economic breakdown, civil violence, and open 
  challenges to such highly symbolic values as secularist nationalism. But 
  in the eyes of the military, all these facets fused into one major failure of 
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  the system: the complete erosion of governmental authority. (Tachau, 
  Heper, 1983: 25)  
 
The regime change in Turkey provided a thornless rose garden for Özal’s 
administration in its determination to divert Turkey from an inward oriented faith to 
neo-liberal orthodoxy.  
 It cannot be a simple coincidence that, shortly after the coup, Özal became the 
official manager of the economy and supervised the execution of the program. 
According to Korkut Boratav, the military regime, for three and a half years, realized 
the development of economic policies in line with the demands of the capitalist class 
but against the workers’ interests. It was quite interesting to hear complaints about 
high real wages in the first address of General Kenan Evren in the first day of 
intervention (Boratav, 1995: 122). In terms of distribution relations, the new model 
attempted to control the fundamental contradiction between capitalists and workers 
in favor of the former because both Özal and the junta regime believed that the 
failure of the previous regime stemmed from its sensitivity towards the demands of 
the latter.  
 The outcomes of the program implemented until 1987 were varied with 
respect to different economic indicators. Although the first five-year plan of the 
program managed to increase the national income, export levels and to decrease 
inflation rate; external and internal debts, together with imports, reached 
unsustainable levels (Boratav, 1995: 128). The allocative and distributive results of 
the new model were much easier to observe.. More to the point, real wages under the 
Motherland Party’s first six-year term decreased to 1967 levels by 1986. The mark-
up rates of commerce capitalists, on the other hand, did not change, or even tended to 
increase (Yeldan, 2002: 69-77).  
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 Another consequence that can de derived from our political assessment of the 
transformation experienced after 1980 military coup, it can be easily said that the 
political turmoil of the 1970s in Turkey had significant effects on deterioration of the 
indicators in the Turkish economy because the governments and other political actors 
of those times had a close interest in increasing their votes with respect to other 
opponent parties. Therefore, the economic downturns or slumps were not seriously 
taken into account. The populist coalition governments forgot their responsibilities 
over economic issues. In other words, economic problems were intentionally 
subordinated to political interests. More to the point, the crisis had far deeper impacts 
as there were no plausible remedies projected for the resulting economic tensions. 
The January 24 measures required an environment which was cleansed of all these 
political struggles and strong opposition of workers. When the military coup of 12 
September 1980, with its concomitant impacts on legislative, executive and judiciary 
branches, is evaluated from this perspective, its effects on the following decade’s 
political and economic situations can be better grasped.  
 
  
 
3.4 The Post-Liberalization Period (1987-2001)  
 
3.4.1 The Mini Crisis of 1987 
 
After the Motherland Party won the elections in November 1987, it secured its 
position at the office until 1992. However, victory came under deteriorating 
economic conditions because deficits both in current account balances, emanating 
from a dramatic rise in import levels, and in the budget were being financed through 
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borrowing and monetizing (accommodating), respectively. The sustainability 
problem was knocking at the door for the Motherland Party in terms of economic 
indicators.  
The former solution of external borrowing came to an end in 1987, as real 
interest rates promised by the state failed to match the demands of the lenders. The 
ongoing borrowing pattern led to a decrease in the creditworthiness of the Turkish 
economy and, as a result, the lenders demanded high rates for providing less amount 
of credit. This was true not only for bilateral lending but also for multilateral.  
 The monetary accommodation of fiscal deficits created appropriate 
conditions for inflation because the growth rate of money in the market was much 
greater than the growth rate of the gross domestic product. General (relative) price 
levels in the country rose to such enormous levels that they began to threaten the 
stability of the economy. Export levels, which were expected to rise, could not 
finance the importation of the goods whose volume far exceeded that of exports. The 
program of the 24 January measures together with the sensitivity on the balance of 
payments issue began to bankrupt the state due the inability of the country to export. 
Hence, the Motherland Party found itself in the middle of constraints arising from 
both interest and inflation rates (Öniş, Riedel, 1993: 103). This was why the years 
1987 to 1989 were examples of a mini crisis. Amendments to the program were 
thought inevitable and prospective solutions to the mini crisis of Turkey were 
formulated on the basis of opening up the country’s financial markets to international 
market players. 
 
 
 
  47 
 
3.4.2 The ‘Solution’ to the Crisis of 1987 
 
The limits on internal and external borrowing arising from high interest rates made 
the Özal administration think of benefiting from these high rates via liberalizing the 
capital regime in Turkey. In other words, international portfolio-holders or market-
players were to be attracted by profitable returns offered by the financial market of 
the country. At the outset, “The Law of Protection of the Turkish Lira” was 
abolished by a parliament controlled by a Motherland Party majority so as to have 
perfectly mobile capital flows into and out of Turkey. In this sense, the legal 
provisions that had put barriers on capital movements into Turkey and out of Turkey 
were abolished. The major aim of this regulation was to finance the deficits in the 
balance of payments by short-term capital inflows to the domestic market. The 
foreign portfolio holders were to be stimulated by high real interest rates and they 
were invited into the Turkish domestic financial market for arbitrage revenues 
(Yeldan, 2002: 127).  
 The transition to convertibility in 1989 altered the composition of all 
economic and political aspects of Turkey. The domestic financial market and the 
indicators in the balance of payments became dependent on the behavior of short-
term and speculative capital inflow and outflow. In other words, all actors in the 
national economy from the highest market players to the wage earners became 
dependent on short-term capital inflows, called “hot money” in the literature 
(Yeldan, 2002: 128). The major determinant of their behaviors, as I explained, is the 
level of real interest rates, so that, beginning from 1989, the Turkish financial system 
promised huge profits generated from interest repayments. The stimulated foreign 
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short-term capitals entered the domestic financial market and expanded the 
consumption volume of the economy through increasing imports (Yeldan, 2002: 
135).  
The most harmful effect of this inflow of hot-money was seen when these 
imports reached threatening levels for the current account balance because hot-
money existing in the economy was not used to finance business fixed investments 
that could enhance the employment opportunities and production facilities. Rather, 
they were allocated to the consumption of foreign final goods so that the initial 
deficit problem could not be solved. In this sense it can be easily seen that the excess 
supply of foreign exchange in the economy altered the consumption patterns of 
people towards a further deterioration of current account balance (Yeldan, 2002: 
136).  
The most harmful effect of speculative-led growth in Turkey has concerned 
the high levels of real interest rates. In order to attract international business players, 
governments and monetary authorities kept interest rates on an increasing trend 
compared to other emerging markets’ rates. In other words, since the short-term 
speculative capital inflow seemed to be the most instantaneous and easiest measure 
to cover the huge gaps in the current account balance; the governments gave their 
consents to the increases in the level of real interest rate. However, especially after 
1994, 1999 and 2001 economic crises, it was observed that the most important 
problem of Turkey was truly the debts which accumulated through rising interest rate 
repayments.  
For the sake of stability in price levels, the Central Bank of the Turkish 
Republic, after receiving its autonomy via structural reform programs, never thought 
of accommodating the deficits in the balances. Thus, issuing treasury bills and 
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government bonds emerged as being two ways of financing the gaps. Inefficient 
utilization of these resources by governments was accompanied with a rise in the 
interest rates of external borrowing so that Turkey found itself in both domestic and 
foreign debt problems. The revenue accounts of the budget could not cover debt 
servicing. This was why the recent programs formulated for a prospective recovery 
in the Turkish economy includes actions that should be taken against the debt 
problem.   
 
 
3.4.2.1 Political Implications of the “Solution” 
 
The emergence of a rentier-seeking capitalist class was born out of the liberalization 
of financial system. The promise of high interest revenues made both the industrial 
and commercial capitalist class reluctant to invest because the profit from operating a 
factory or trading in goods or services could not reach the levels of interest revenues. 
Thus, we can claim that short-term capital flows created fluctuations in the current 
account balance instead of financing it and led to the emergence of a new financial 
capitalist class, who mainly benefited from interest revenues, which in turn brought 
about defects in the distribution relations (Yeldan, 2002: 141).  
 Including the last economic downturn we witnessed on February 2001, nearly 
every crisis after the transition to convertibility in 1989 had something to do with 
capital flows because they could easily outflow from the national markets without 
any costs and barriers. But the cost of such an exit to the national economy was 
significant such as dramatic increases in interest, unemployment and inflation rates. 
The major source of fragility and vulnerability of the Turkish economy was these 
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speculative, short-term capital flows: “Since Turkey had an experience of transition 
to financial liberalization without adequate financial deepness and regulatory 
provisions, crisis became the destiny of Turkey like all other underdeveloped 
countries.” (Yeldan, 2002: 144). 
 The implication both for the capitalist class and workers is easy to derive 
from the above mentioned data on the last decade of the Turkish economy. As we see 
from the movement of capital flows, the financial capitalist class, mainly the banking 
sector, gained a significant place in the Turkish economy. They were receiving the 
lion’s share of national income because interest rate revenues were being transferred 
to this newly-emerged class. The story for workers, on the contrary, was not the 
same. Every time speculative short term capital escaped from the national income, 
the cost of this outflow was imposed on fixed income groups like workers, civil 
servants and retired people. The increases in indirect taxes and limited promotions in 
wages and salaries are clear examples of costs for these groups. While the financial 
bourgeoisie took the gains, the pain belonged to the workers.  
 Another important political implication of the transformation Turkey 
experienced concerned the introduction of autonomous boards like Competition 
Board, Capital Markets Board of Turkey, Telecommunication Board...etc. On the 
way towards the realization of neo-liberal orthodox principles, deregulation and a 
shift of authority from executive power to these boards can be regarded as the major 
steps. Through these institutions and boards, populist and manipulative actions were 
to be wiped from the political scene in Turkey. Since they were left to their own 
rationales in their operations and actions, the decisions taken by the boards began to 
reflect solely the interests of the market. In order to sustain credibility and stability in 
economic and financial transactions, they behaved in accordance with the invisible 
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rules of the free market system. As a final point, not only are the financial markets 
together with trade regime opened to international markets, but also the decision-
making processes became a function of regulations legislated at the international 
level.    
 
 
3.5 Conclusion   
 
One of the major findings of my research about transformation in Turkey concerns 
the composition of the beneficiaries and losers in society after the transformations 
experienced during the last four decades. With the inward orientedness of the 1960s 
and 1970s, we witnessed the emergence of an industrial capitalist class as the main 
beneficiary of the new model. During the export-led growth times, with the 
liberalization of commerce, the commercial capitalist, increased its importance in 
decision-making processes. Lastly, with a transition to convertibility, a rent seeking 
financial capitalist class became the most advantaged segment of society. Therefore, 
the capitalist class of Turkey, by adapting its focus to the changing economic 
conditions in the world, benefits from the policies implemented by governments. 
 Moreover, the political economy history of the Turkish Republic 
demonstrates a tendency towards integration with the international system of the 
Western world. In the early years, the country determined its regime and political 
structure with respect to the hereditary principles of Western democracy and 
secularism. Although a transition to a multi-party system took a long time, namely 
until 1945, with reforms undertaken by the first republican governments Turkey 
proved itself in terms of modernization. The period between 1960 and 1980 was a 
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time of a struggle for industrialization in Turkey. The consequences of these efforts 
were debatable but, at least, the country started to develop large enterprises 
producing for the domestic market. The fastest movement of Turkey towards the 
Western system was during Motherland Party under Özal’s administration. In other 
words, the political and sociological reforms undertaken by previous republican 
governments were completed by economic and especially trade reforms implemented 
by the Özal administration. Turkey’s integration into the international political, 
economic and financial system matured under Motherland Party governments.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
Comparable Economic Performances of the US, the UK and 
Turkey 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this part of my dissertation, I will deal with the statistical indicators derived from 
the economic performances of the US, the UK and Turkey. I will focus on the 
period between 1960 and 1990, as these were the years when these countries passed 
through a welfare state tradition to a neo-liberal one. My primary aim in doing such 
a statistical analysis is to base my thesis on quantitative grounds. 
 I determined four main categories to assess the economic performance: real 
GDP growth rates, inflation rates, real interest rates, and real wages. The reason why 
I focus on analyzing these indicators is to have a general assessment of the 
economies. By not going into the details, I will exhibit the findings provided by 
official agencies of the countries in question and then I will make an interpretation 
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of the results. Since the contend of my thesis concerns political economy, the 
attention is mainly given to the political implication of these statistical indicators.    
 Particularly, the inclination of the real wages will provide the consolidated 
hints for my political analysis. The real GDP growth rate has something to do with 
the development path of a country, whether the country has a stable or fluctuating 
growth path. An analysis of inflation rate is inevitable for my thesis which compares 
the Keynesian and Monetarist schools of economics. An overview of the trends in 
real interest rates will provide information concerning who are the losers and the 
beneficiaries in the financial economy. 
 
 
4.2 Real GDP Growth Rates 
 
The macroeconomic assessment of three countries begins with a close look at their 
real GDP growth rates. This constitutes a considerable part of this chapter since the 
tendency of real GDP over the years is accepted as one of the most important 
indicators of economic development level. There are basically two reasons for real 
GDP to change over time: The first comes from the available amount of resources 
which are capital and labor; the second is related the efficiency in the factors of 
production, which means productivity increases (Dornbusch, 1994: 10-11). Together 
with the political background, the aim of this part is to capture the reasons lying 
behind the fluctuations in real GDP rates. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the path of growth rates in the US and the UK. The first 
observation derived from the chart is, obviously, the instability of growth rates in 
both countries. Between 1960 and 1990, it was hard to find a stable inclination or 
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movement in terms of real GDP growth. Thus, both Keynesian and conservative 
policies could not create consolidated and sustainable growth rates in the real GDP 
levels. The fluctuating lines tell us, also, an interesting point concerning the fact that 
the rates in both of the countries mostly followed the same paths. With some 
exceptions like 1971, 1985 and 1987, the US and the UK entered recession or 
reached peaks simultaneously. This was a clear evidence of their concerted actions 
not only in politics but economics as well. 
   
Real GDP Growth, The US and UK
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Figure 1, Source: The US Data: Fed, The UK Data: Bank of England 
  
Another result that can be formulated from the Figure 1 has something to do with 
the real GDP rate they exhibited in 1990. More to the point, the real rates of GDP 
growth in 1961 were 2.35 % and 2.56 % in the US and the UK, respectively. When 
we look at the same data for 1990, the rates were 1.87 % for the US and 0.78 % for 
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the UK. Therefore, in real terms, the countries’ growth rates declined below what 
they were in 1960. The policy shift from welfare state to conservative economy 
created an economic boom instantly but only after one decade, the economic activity 
in these two countries slowed down to 1960 level. This can be explained by two 
major reasons: The first one concerned the world business cycle which was on a 
severe recession beginning from the second half of the 1980s. The other reason 
comes from the saturated financial demands in the existing internationalized 
markets. This meant that the opportunities for financial investors came to an end 
because of the inadequate number of domestic markets which allowed perfect 
capital mobility. 
 Figure 2 is depicting the growth rate for Turkey. During protectionist times, 
Turkey showed the same path with the US and the UK. There was a stable growth in 
the 1960s and 1990s, but then a sharp decline in the growth rate came to the 
foreground in 1977. Statistically speaking, the growth rates were 6.4 %, 1.5 % and 
2.0 % in 1963, 1978 and 1979 respectively. However, Turkey showed no sign of 
huge fluctuations during the first decade of import substitution industrialization 
Strategy (ISI) , when compared to what was the case in the US and the UK for the 
same time period.  
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Figure 2, Source: State Planning Organization, “Basic Macroeconomic Indicators” 
 
Like the US and the UK, Turkey displayed a steady increase of growth rates in the 
first half of the 1980s. Özal government succeeded in achieving a rise in the real 
GDP rates. This could be explained by several reasons. The most important one was 
the fact that the Motherland Party government increased international credibility of 
Turkey due to two major facts: The first concerned the point that the political 
turmoil and stalemate were evaluated as the outcomes of coalition governments of 
the 1960s and the 1970s. Hence, the Motherland Party government which held the 
majority of the seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly gave the signs of 
stability and consistency both in the legislation of the laws and the execution of 
policies. Second factor that increased Turkey’s creditworthiness came from Turgut 
Özal’s personal persistence on implementing liberalization strategy. In other words, 
Turgut Özal believed in the necessity and the significance of internationalization of 
the domestic market. Eventually, Turkey was awarded with debt relief and increases 
in the amount of foreign aid flows from the International Monetary Fund. However, 
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the second half of the 1980s showed a decline which was similar to what we 
witnessed in the US and the UK. Internationally speaking, the world recession, as 
explained before, was the initial effect on this backlash. Moreover, national 
recession emanating from the debt crisis was the triggering impact on this downturn 
of Turkish economy. 
 
 
4.3 Inflation Rates 
 
Inflation is widely defined as “a rise in the average level of prices-that is, a rise in 
the price level.” (Lipsey, Courant, Ragan, 1998: 650). While it is located in the main 
axis of conservative or neo-liberal policies, inflation is not considered as a major 
economic tension in Keynesian school of economic thought. Although there are 
many academic explanations for why inflation occurs in an economy, I will not deal 
with those issues. Rather, my preference will be on policy effects over the inflation 
rates in the US, the UK and Turkey. I will focus on the turning points in 1960-1990 
period. The peak points, the bottom levels and the tendencies observed in this period 
will be analyzed with clear references to the economic policies executed.  
 Figure 3 shows the movement of the inflation rates (Consumer Price Index) 
in the US and the UK. Between 1960 and 1970, the inflation rates in two countries 
fluctuated within the bandwidth of 1 % and 5 %. It seems that welfare state 
implementations created an environment in which the general price levels did not 
expose a threat for monetary base of the markets in the US and the UK. 
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Figure 3, Source: The US data, Fed; The UK data, Bank of England. (Consumer Price 
Index) 
 
  
Internal factors like huge budget deficits or expansionary monetary policies did not 
lead to a major crisis until an exogenous supply shock resulting from OPEC 
decision. The cartel of oil-producing countries cut down the production first in 
1973-1974 and then in 1979-1980. These unanticipated shocks paralyzed the 
economies of these two advanced capitalist countries because their developed 
industries were highly dependent on oil as the major intermediary good or input. 
 Figure 3 shows us that there were two peak points in the inflation rates 
between 1960 and 1990. Not coincidentally, they were in close concordance with 
the OPEC oil shocks. Double-digit inflation rates hit these advanced capitalist 
countries. Particularly, the years between 1974 and 1982 laid out a huge volatility in 
the general price levels. Thus, it is not surprising to witness rising voices against 
inflation. More to the point, neo-liberal orthodoxy in economics targeted the price 
stability as a primer and an ultimate objective. The populist expansionary pattern 
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was challenged so as to make the things balanced both in budget and in the 
monetary base.  
 The consequence of tight fiscal and monetary policies executed under 
Reagan and Thatcher administrations accomplished dramatic decline in inflation 
rates. Conservative coalition in the US and the UK got rid of the double-digit 
inflation rates by 1982. The downward slope of the lines in Figure 3 reached their 
bottom levels in 1986 (1.86 % in the US, 3 % in the UK). The inflation rate in that 
year was same with that of in 1965. However, the recession in the world economy 
pulled the inflation rates to higher levels than they used to be in the previous years. 
For instance, the upward inclination in inflation rates started to be observed in 1987. 
The rates were (3.66, 4.17), (4.12, 4.91), (4.81, 7.76) and (5.39, 9.46) in 1987, 1988, 
1989 and 1990 for the US and the UK, respectively. Hence, the same faith replicated 
itself for these capitalist countries. 
 This is to mean that the pattern of inflation rates changed its path due to a 
shock coming from an exogenous and international source in the second half of the 
1970s. We witness the same historical denouement in the second half of the 1980s. 
Those were the years when the boom in inflation rates was finally put under control. 
 I depicted 30 year history of inflation rates (wholesale price index) of Turkey 
in the Figure 4. Turkey entered the double-digit period in 1971 which was nearly 
half a decade before the US and the UK. During the planned economy years, the 
inflation rates in Turkey revolved around an average of 5% per annum. Although it 
fluctuated in a larger bandwidth (i.e 1.2 % in 1964 and 8.1 % in 1965) than what the 
US and the UK had, the price stability did not pose a major threat for the economy. 
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 Inflation Rate, Turkey (Wholesale Price Index)
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Figure 4, Source: State Statistics Institute (Wholesale Price Index) 
 
  
The political instability resulting from coalition government, the violence on the 
streets and the lack of compromise between the workers and the capitalists were 
known to be the outcomes of the relatively liberal environment backed by 1961 
Constitution. Especially, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was declaring its discontent 
concerning the expanded human rights and liberties in the constitution. The 
culmination point of this aversion was a coup by memorandum in 1971. The 
economic consequence of this political distress was firstly observed in the inflation 
rates. To illustrate, while the wholesale price index in 1970 was 6.7 %, the rate 
jumped to 15.9 % as a result of a dramatic devaluation of Turkish Lira against 
foreign exchanges. The entrance of double-digit inflation rates started with this year 
in Turkey. Although the political actors and economic authorities were aware of the 
breakdown experienced in the economy, the political race or competition for 
capturing the power, which was frequent in coalition government period, prevented 
the governments from dealing with the crisis seriously.  Their major motive was to 
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hold the power so that populist policies could not be abolished and the balance in 
fiscal and monetary indicators deteriorated. OPEC crisis came to the scene in such a 
severe domestic situation. Hence, with the worsening effect of sharp increases in oil 
prices, the inflation rates transcended 50% threshold and in 1980, the annual rise in 
general price level reached 107.2 %.  
 The ISI strategy or inward-orientedness could not achieve a stable economy. 
Even the development strategy of the 1960s and the 1970s made Turkey paralyzed in 
terms of foreign exchange shortages. The problem of inflation in Turkey was born 
out of this conjuncture. 
 When 24 January Measures were announced under the Demirel government, 
it was becoming clear that Turkey transformed its path of development from ISI to 
the export-led growth model. Turgut Özal’s insistence on the liberalization of 
domestic economy had similar policy orientation with that of Ronald Reagan and 
Margaret Thatcher. When the Motherland Party took over the parliament in 1983, 
after the military coup in 1980, Özal declared the inflation as the premier deficiency 
of Turkish economy and like Reagan and Thatcher, Özal put the principle of price 
stability on the top of priority list. Though the price stability was the major concern 
of Motherland Party government, success on inflation rate did not go on well with 
the expectations. During 1983-1990 period, the inflation rate -which declined sharply 
under the military rule between 1980 and 1983- began to rise from 30.6 %. In 1990, 
the rate reached 52.3 % which was the level of 1978 and far above the 1960s’ rates.  
 Unlike the US and the UK, the international oil shocks had deeper impacts on 
the Turkish economy. What’s more, the transformation to neo-liberal policies made 
the inflation problem turn out to be a chronic problem of Turkish economy whereas 
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the US and the UK, with their advanced capitalist mode of production, got over the 
problem in a relatively short period.  
 
 
 
 
4.4 Real Interest Rates 
 
 
The distributional implication of an economic policy transformation can easily be 
measured through the behavioral pattern of real interest rates. It is commonly defined 
in the literature as follows: “The real interest rate measures the real return on a loan, 
in terms of purchasing power.” (Lipsey, Courant, Ragan, 1998: 459). The gains from 
real interest rates benefited the capitalist and rentier class of an economy. Thus, an 
increase in the level of real interest rate means a reallocation and redistribution of 
national income not in favor of fixed income groups such as retired people, civil 
servants and workers. This is why I prefer to have a look at the history of real interest 
rates in the US, the UK and Turkey. 
 As I explained in the previous chapters, the interest rate was thought to be a 
typical problem in the Keynesain School of economic thought. Since it has a 
worsening impact on both investment expenditures and on distributional indicators, 
welfare state took the issue of interest rate seriously. In contrast, neo-liberal 
orthodoxy understanding warranted mainly monetary base stability,  as the first and 
foremost priority was price stability for conservative economics. 
 Figure 5 illustrates the real interest rates both in the US and the UK. As can 
be seen from the figure, the rates were moving around 4 or 5 % until the first half of 
the 1960s. The need to finance deficits in the budget, caused by excessive social 
expenditures, the governments of these tow countries started to have fiscal deficits. 
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As a conclusion, we began to witness a rise in real interest rate between 1970 and 
1982. Statistically speaking, the rate in 1960 was 4.41 % and 5.21 % in the US and 
the UK, respectively. However, it reached 8.43 % and 13.34 % for the US and the 
UK in 1974. In 1981, it was 14.14 % in the US and 13.32 % in the UK. Worsened by 
international supply shocks, the advanced capitalist countries found themselves in the 
middle of a debt crisis. Even though they were implementing welfare policies for the 
1960s and the 1970s, they could not control the real interest rates in the market so 
that they increased to such levels that were three times of two decades ago. 
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Figure 5, Source: Moody’s for the US, Bank of England for the UK 
 
 
 
With Reagan and Thatcher administrations, the increasing real interest rates started 
to move to another plateau. For the first half of the 1980s, relatively high real interest 
rate was observed for the US and the UK. Although there were adjustment processes 
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to this new set of neo-liberal policies, the rates remained at approximately 9 % which 
was an average level in the second half of the 1970s. When compared to the 1980s, it 
seemed for two advanced capitalist countries that they began to control the motion of 
real interest rates. 
 The case for Turkey started with the 1970s in Figure 6. As is clearly seen 
from the chart, unlike the US and the UK, Turkey did not have a volatile structure in 
interest rates over the 1970s because they were under close supervision of 
government. After the 24 January measures the determination of real interest rates 
was liberalized. They began to fluctuate and increase over time. Central Bank’s 
discount rates exhibited higher plateaus for interest rates in each decade. For 
instance, in the 1970s, average rate was 9.50 %; it was approximately 44 % in the 
1980s. This was a strong increase and its consequences in the economy were very 
severe. The distributional effect was observed in increased incomes of capitalist class 
which benefited from the huge increase in the real interest rates. It also halted the 
private investment expenditures in Turkey, except for highway construction and 
housing investment. The dramatic increase experienced in real interest rates was a 
signal for imminent debt crisis after 1990 since the debt service of Turkey would 
accumulate to unsustainable levels. 
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Figure 6, Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey 
 
  
A major conclusion that can be derived from the path real interest rates followed is 
that advanced capitalist countries were able to cool down the financial sector, 
whereas the peripheral economies like Turkey could not stop the rise in real interest 
rates. This may be due to the lack of financial depth of the Turkish economy. In other 
words, since there was no sufficient capital accumulation in Turkey, as explained in 
previous chapters, its financial stamina could not cope with the liberalization of 
interest rates. 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Real Wages 
 
 
The analysis of the real wages is probably the most important part of this chapter 
because the political implications arising from the policy shift from welfare state 
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understanding to neo-liberal orthodoxy can be clearly seen when the situation of 
workers are scrutinized. Since the real wage levels are reliable indicators of 
distributional relations in the economy, I will make a deeper investigation on real 
wages than on other macroeconomic variables seen in my dissertation.  
 The real wage is, by definition, the inflation- adjusted nominal wage which 
helps us to understand the purchasing power of a current amount of wage in the base 
year. Thus, while we are giving references to the real wages, workers’ share in the 
national income and their wealth will become visible. As they are giving clues for 
antagonistic class struggles between workers and capitalists, the real wage indicator is 
commonly used in political economy researches (Boratav, 1998; Yeldan 2002; 
Voyvoda, Metin-Özcan, Yeldan, 2000;). When the things change in favor of workers, 
purchasing power of their wages increases in comparison to the base year. On the 
other hand, the decrease in the real wages signifies an increase in the profits of 
capitalists, in general. 
 In the Figure 7, I tried to depict a chart in which we can see the history of real 
wage situation in the US and the UK. I hold the time span as 1960-1990 again but in 
averages of five years in order to see the path more clearly.  In general, we do not see 
large fluctuations in the real wage levels in our sample of advanced capitalist 
countries. If we took the base year as 1960 (1960=100), the level of real wages 
seemed to be increasing until 1970-1974 period. The change was a bit more in the UK 
than in the US. This may due to the highly unionized workers of the UK during the 
1960s and the 1970s. Welfare state premiums and social expenditure policy of those 
years worked in favor of workers and the increase we witnessed could not be 
regarded as a simple coincidence. In other words, the beneficiaries of the system of 
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Keynesian school of economic thought were the workers because they can purchase 
more when compared to what they can do in 1960.  
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Figure 7, Source: Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
Afterwards, as we can see from the Figure 7, the increasing inclination came to a halt 
during the second half of the 1970s and this continued until 1984. More to the point, 
real wages both in the US and the UK started to become fixed at their current levels 
by Reagan and Thatcher administrations. As the neo-liberal orthodoxy evaluated the 
wage levels as the first and the most important cause lying behind the high inflation 
rates, the conservative governments, quite rationally, introduced policies which were 
against the well-being of the workers. For example, as explained in the previous 
chapters, the social expenditures were decreased to their minimum levels and wages 
were repressed for the sake of price stability in the market. Trade Unions’ collective 
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bargaining power were abolished or lessened to ceremonial mode. Hence, the attack 
on the accomplishments of welfare state gave its antecedent signs on the real wage 
levels.  
The 1980s displayed different outcomes for the US and the UK in terms of 
real wage levels. Under Reagan administration, the US real wages turned to our base 
year level. In other words, in 1989, a typical American worker could only buy what 
he could in 1960. The tendency of decreasing real wages persisted until the first of 
half of the 1990s as well. Reagan administration was successful in both decreasing 
the real wages and the inflation during the same period. Repressed wages, decreasing 
inflation rates, and increasing interest were observed concomitantly. The capitalist 
and rentier classes were the beneficiaries of this policy change. The case for the UK 
was different for the same time period. As is seen from Figure 7, the United Kingdom 
has witnessed an increase in the real wage levels. The reason for this difference from 
the US could be better explained by the power trade unions in England. Throughout 
the time, they could put pressure on governments to increase wages. This was why we 
observed a different pattern of behavior in the UK. 
Figure 8 demonstrates the real wage levels and labor productivity of Turkey 
between 1950 and 1995. We can use the perpendicular dashed line as a separator for 
two different time periods in Turkey. In the first period, as I explained, welfare state 
was in effect and the social expenditures were seen as major duties of state. Thus, 
employment benefits reached their maximum levels between 1950 and 1980. Highly 
unionized and organized workers, who were benefiting from the freedoms in the 1961 
Constitution, had convincing power over the entrepreneurs, factory owners and other 
capitalists. Right to collective bargaining was excessively used by Turkish workers in 
order to make their demands fulfilled by the owner of the factories. As a result, nearly 
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four decades, we witness a steady increase in the real wage levels in private 
manufacturing industry of Turkey. Particularly, the second half of the 1970s was a 
clear peak level for wages. Since the labor productivity moved along the real wage 
line in the Figure 8, we could not talk about an exploitation of labor during those 
years.  
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The transformation to the neo liberal regime after 1980 had the greatest effects on 
both real wage levels and the labor productivity. Wages were repressed intentionally 
by Özal government in Turkey in order to satisfy the ultimate objectives of neo-
liberal orthodoxy: Price stability and restoration of capitalist hegemony. As I 
explained earlier, Özal found the increases in the real wage levels as the most 
significant cause for the high inflation rates so that the instant action should be 
directed towards the acquisitions of welfare state. They were trade unions, 
employment benefits and liberal environment. However, with the help of military 
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coup in 1980, Özal was able to repress the wage levels until the second half of 1980s. 
After 1986, Turkish workers began to act collectively in order to secure their wages 
so that, as we see from the chart, the real wage level increased. 
 The labor productivity line, on the other hand, tells us a different story from 
the real wage increases in the second half of the 1980s. The movement along the real 
wage line was not valid for this period. The value added per labor increased far 
above the real wage increases. In other words, Turkish workers were forced to work 
more in return for high wages. Transformation to neo-liberal policies made labor 
force in Turkey much more productive than they used to be in the past. The question 
concerning the determination of losers and gainers of this transformation finds its 
answer in this chart. In sum, it can be said that conservative economy in Turkey 
created an environment in which the capitalist class as a whole regained their 
privileges from workers who benefited from the welfare state during the 1960s and 
the 1970s.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Throughout the dissertation, I seek to address the issue of neo-liberal transformation 
experienced in the United States, the United Kingdom and Turkey. Within a 
comparative manner, the economic and political performances of them were 
analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Having supported the title of my 
thesis, we see a simultaneous transformation to liberal policies which generated 
distinct results for advanced and peripheral countries. More to the point, there are 
mainly three points we can count for conclusion. Firstly, the 1980s provided the 
same political and economic pattern for these countries. In other words, we witness a 
conservative shift in politics whereas an intense liberalization in economics. 
Although the political priorities and preferences exhibited a conservative 
understanding, the economic framework inclined towards liberal orthodoxy. As I 
mentioned, all these transformations occurred in our country sample at the same 
time.  
 Secondly, the liberalization period in these countries was executed or 
undertaken by personal figures. President Ronald Reagan in the United States, Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Prime Minister Turgut Özal 
in Turkey played the most significant role in diverting their countries to neo-liberal 
policy framework. Particularly Turkey, which was in the middle of tensions arising 
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from populist implementations in the 1970s, could not realize its liberalization unless 
Turgut Özal was decisive and persistent on the necessity of this transformation. He 
played a leading role in Turkey’s destiny which lost its creditworthiness during the 
1970s. Although the beneficiaries of the transformation constituted the minor part of 
Turkish population, Turkey, with its economic affiliation, became a part of 
international community.  
 Thirdly, the outcomes of liberalization period were different when we 
compare two advanced capitalist countries with Turkey. Especially, the real interest 
rates, inflation rates and real wage levels were the clear indicators of this difference. 
For example, the inflation problem was solved in the United States and the United 
Kingdom in the second half of the 1980s whereas in Turkey, inflation turned out to 
be a chronic problem in the same period. By the same token, the real GDP growth in 
the United States and the United Kingdom was not financed via repression of real 
wages but in Turkey, except for 1989 and 1990, the economic growth was financed 
through a decline in the real wage levels. Since the purchasing power of workers in 
the economy decreased via this process of repression, there occurred a surplus in 
goods and services market so that this surplus could be exported. This way was 
intentionally chosen as Turkey was believed not to have a production capacity, in 
those times, to fulfill both domestic and international demands. 
  As a result, when I look beyond the time period of the dissertation, I can 
easily say that what we experienced in the 1970s and the 1980s was a transition time 
from protectionist policies to financial economies. The United States, the United 
Kingdom and Turkey passed through a way which was directing these countries 
towards a financial economic rule. Financial economics becomes the major issue for 
these three countries shortly after 1990. Thus, this dissertation can be furthered by 
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looking at 1990-2000 period in order to observe the transition characteristic of 1960-
1990 period.     
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